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The strategic and operational landscape of emergency services in the UK 
 
Abstract 
The organisational and service delivery landscape of the emergency services in the UK has 
been rapidly changing and is facing further change in the foreseeable future. This paper 
examines recent and ongoing organisational changes in the policy development, service 
delivery and regulatory landscape of the emergency services, in order to capture the overall 
picture and potential opportunities for improvement or further investigation. This general 
review utilises the characteristics of the three domains of a national framework, namely policy 
development, service delivery, and public assurance and uses these characteristics as lenses 
through which to examine the three main blue light emergency services of police, fire and 
ambulances.  What emerges in the organisational landscape and conceptual maps for the 
police and even more so for Fire and Rescue Services, is the immaturity of many of the 
organisations in the policy and the public assurance domains while the service delivery 
organisations have remained relatively stable. In the relatively neglected ambulance services, 
we find the NHS’s recent Ambulance Response Programme has considerable potential to 
improve parts of all three domains. Although the National Audit Office has attempted in the 
past to provide organisational landscape reviews of individual emergency services, this 
contemporary comparative review of all three services using a common model is unique. It 
provides considerable new insights for policy makers, service delivers and regulators. 
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Introduction 
The three ‘blue light’ emergency services, police, fire, and ambulance services have been 
facing unprecedented challenges as the nature, form and pattern of risks and emergencies 
faced by society continues to increase and change (Wankhade and Weir, 2015; Wankhade 
and Mackway-Jones, 2015; Murphy and Greenhalgh, 2018). Multiple terrorist attacks, 
historical and contemporary child abuse scandals, and major fire incidents as varied as the 
“rapidly developed and aggressive wildfires” at Saddleworth Moor to the Grenfell Tower 
disaster in London and the explosions in Leicester, have all challenged the capacity and 
increased the pressure on the emergency services in recent months. The effective 
management of emergency services has never been more important than in today’s high-
pressure cost-conscious public sector. 
As can be seen from any number of recent government publications, such as the latest 
National Framework for Fire and Rescue Services (Home Office, 2018a), the government’s 
policies and its response to prolonged austerity in the UK continues to dominate public service 
delivery, service deployment, and the public services regulatory framework. It is, therefore, 
an obvious starting point to examine the government’s policy response to austerity as it 
affects the emergency services.  
In practice, this policy response has two major parameters, the first is the resource package 
available to the services, and the second is the legislative basis upon which they can act and 
spend. However, before we examine these two major parameters, it is helpful to illustrate 
how these two parameters relate to the strategic and operational organisation landscape of 
emergency services and how all three relate to the three inter-related domains of policy 
development, service delivery and the regulatory environment designed to provide assurance 
to the public, the government and the sectors key stakeholders. 
We have tried to show all of these relationships on the simple illustrative model below.  
 
Figure 1. Three domains of the organisational landscape (Murphy and Lakoma, 2018).   
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The starting point for the development of any public service model must be the public interest 
and the values and/or principles enshrined within public service. In the UK, this is relatively 
simple to identify since anyone who works as a public office-holder or a direct or indirect 
employee in the UK must adhere to the seven principles of public life known as the 'Nolan 
principles' (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1995). These cover selflessness, integrity, 
objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership. They are defined in Table 1 
and shown in Figure 1 as a large outer circle.  In developing any policy developments or 
frameworks for delivery of Emergency Services, ministerial legislators and officials must 
adhere to and promote these principles in their work. The principles operate across and 
throughout any public activity, and across and throughout any public service context in the 
UK. They are not unique to the UK but they are universal to UK public services. 
Table 1: Nolan principles (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1995, p.1) 
Standard Description 
1. Selflessness Holders of public office should act solely in terms of the public interest. 
2. Integrity 
 
Holders of public office must avoid placing themselves under any 
obligation to people or organisations that might try inappropriately to 
influence them in their work. They should not act or take decisions in 
order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their 
family, or their friends. They must declare and resolve any interests and 
relationships. 
3. Objectivity Holders of public office must act and take decisions impartially, fairly 
and on merit, using the best evidence and without discrimination or 
bias. 
4. Accountability 
 
Holders of public office are accountable to the public for their decisions 
and actions and must submit themselves to the scrutiny necessary to 
ensure this. 
5. Openness 
 
Holders of public office should act and take decisions in an open and 
transparent manner. Information should not be withheld from the 
public unless there are clear and lawful reasons for so doing. 
6. Honesty Holders of public office should be truthful. 
7. Leadership 
 
Holders of public office should exhibit these principles in their own 
behaviour. They should actively promote and robustly support the 
principles and be willing to challenge poor behaviour wherever it occurs. 
 
In addition to these values and principles, there are also situational or contextual constraints 
that act as the strategic parameters to the development of frameworks and other 
policy/service/assurance regimes. Most national policy documents and frameworks attempt 
to cover these situational issues at the start of the documents as they ‘set the scene’ for any 
proposals that follow in the main body of the policy or framework. They generally include the 
legislative basis that provides the authority and legitimacy for the proposals, the current or 
revised strategic and operational organisational landscape that the service operates within, 
the resource envelope deemed to be available and the timescales (short, medium and long-
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term) that the framework is expected to cover. The key components of the context for 
emergency services in terms of policy/service delivery/public assurance are shown in the 
second circle. 
Since the introduction of National Frameworks for Fire and Rescue Services, the publication 
of various mission statements and visions for policing services the government’s operating 
mandate for the NHS, it has become apparent that in order to be effective they need to be 
cognisant and make provision for three interconnected ‘domains’. These three domains are 
shown at the conceptual core of our model. They are: 
• The policy development domain – which determines the objectives of any policy, 
whether national, regional or local, but also identifies what the parameters to its 
development and implementation are, and whether its delivery is feasible and 
realistic? 
• The service delivery domain - which determines how the service is to be delivered and 
ideally how is its delivery is to be optimised, continually improved, sustained, 
innovated and constructively monitored? 
• Finally, the assurance or regulatory domain - how is the public to be provided with 
reassurance that the money taken from them to finance the policy prescriptions and 
the strategic and operational delivery of the service, is justified and does it provide 
value for money?  
Joined-up policy development (and preferably policy making) is particularly important in 
services, such as the emergency services, that have mutually inter-dependent responsibilities 
to the public at national and local community levels (Kozuch and Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek, 2014; 
Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek, 2017). Efficient and effective service delivery in emergency services is 
also equally interdependent at local and national levels. The objectives of the assurance and 
regulatory arrangements need to transcend all three emergency services to address wider 
community or public goals and objectives, such as public safety and security, rather than 
narrow individual organisational goals and objectives.  
These three inter-connected domains clearly have overlaps and some of their individual 
aspects in common. They also have some aspects that are specific to the particular domain. 
We have illustrated this in Figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2. Components of the three domains (Murphy and Lakoma, 2018). 
 
In our model these three core domains also inter-relate with the three broader parameters 
shown in the first circle, so before we examine the organisational landscapes of the individual 
emergency services let us look briefly at both the overall resource envelope and the legislative 
basis, and the outlook for these two parameters in the UK in the immediate future. 
The Resource Envelope 
On the 19th February 2016, the government published 17 single departmental plans for each 
government department for the period 2015 to 2020 (Home Office, 2016a). These new plans 
described the new minority governments objectives and were intended to ensure that each 
department’s plan reflected the policies and priorities of the whole of government and that 
they could be delivered within the budgets agreed at the Spending Review 2015 (HM Treasury, 
2015).  At this time the police where the responsibility of the Home Office, Ambulances and 
the NHS were the responsibility of the Department of Health and Fire and Rescue Services 
where the responsibility of the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). 
The relevant departmental expenditure limits are given (in cash terms and in billions) in Table 
2 below.  They effectively represent a medium-term reduction in cash terms and a greater 
reduction in real terms for all emergency services in all parts of the country. 
Table 2: 2015 Spending Review Departmental Expenditure Limits (HM Treasury, 2015). 
Departmental 
Expenditure 
Limit 
2015-
16 
2016-
17 
2017-
18 
2018-
19 
2019-
20 
2020-
21 
Cumulative 
Real 
Growth 
Home Office 10.3 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.6 * -4.8% 
Department of 
Health 
111.6 115.6 118.7 121.3 124.1 128.2 +3.3% 
Policy
Internal and External Scrutiny
Standards, Codes and Benchmarks
Evidence
Strategic Policy Intent
Co-production
Strategic Alignment
Mutual Policy Support
Delivery
Internal and External Scrutiny
Standards, Codes and Benchmarks
Evidence
Leadership and Governance
Performance Management
Partnerships and Collaborations
Improvement and Innovation
Assurance
Internal and External Scrutiny
Standards, Codes and Benchmarks
Evidence
Internal Audit
Peer Review
External Audit and Inspection
Public Reporting
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DCLG Local 
Government 
11.5 9.6 7.4 6.1 5.4 * -6.7% 
Scotland 25.9 26.1 26.3 26.3 26.5 * -5.0% 
Wales 12.9 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 * -4.5% 
Northern 
Ireland 
9.7 9.8 9.9 9.9 9.9 * -5.0% 
 
Although these departmental plans were updated in December 2017 (by which time 
responsibility for Fire and Rescue Services had been transferred to the Home Office), the 
latest annual ‘supply’ estimates presented to the House of Commons by Her Majesty’s 
Treasury (HM Treasury) in April 2017 and April 2018 are still based upon the 2015 Spending 
Review. In fact, the Chancellor Phillip Hammond in his ‘Spring Statement’ in March 2018 (HM 
Treasury, 2018) made no new spending announcements and stated that the next 
comprehensive Spending Review to accompany a medium-term financial strategy will not be 
until 2019.  Thus the ‘resource envelope’ available to all three emergency services and to all 
three devolved administrations will continue to contract up until 2020/21. 
The legislative framework 
The recent policy response, and the capacity of the government and the civil service to affect 
statutory change in the UK’s legislative framework has been severely curtailed by the need of 
UK politicians, senior civil servants and policy makers to respond to the challenges of the 
European Referendum’s vote to leave the European Union (EU). The Queen’s Speech at the 
2017 state opening of parliament (and the legislative programme that followed) was 
overwhelmingly dominated by the “government’s priority to secure the best possible deal as 
the country leaves the European Union governments” (Cabinet Office, 2017, p.1). In June 
2018 the Prime Minister went two steps further, both cancelling the 2018 Queen’s speech to 
give the government more time to push through laws relating to the exit and doubling the 
next parliamentary session to two years rather than one to give “MPs and peers the maximum 
time possible to scrutinise Brexit legislation” (Press Association 2017, p.1).  
Thus, change in the legislative basis in the foreseeable future is likely to be limited. In stark 
contrast, however, one of the final pieces of major legislation that was enacted immediately 
before the European referendum dominated the legislative programme, did significantly 
affect and continues to affect the strategic and operational landscape of the emergency 
services.  
This was the Policing and Crime Act 2017, which is a bit of a misnomer of a title since Part 1 
of the Act is intended to promote greater strategic and operational collaboration between all 
three emergency services, and chapters 2 to 4 deal specifically with Fire and Rescue functions. 
The Act arguably also generated as many changes in the strategic and operational landscape 
of Fire and Rescue Services as it did for the police, although it did not have as much impact 
on the ambulance services as envisioned in the government’s original proposals contained in 
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the consultation “Enabling closer working between the Emergency Services” (Home Office, 
2016b).  
The Policing and Crime Act 2017 is, therefore, a convenient and appropriate place to start to 
distinguish the strategic and operational landscape of the three individual emergency services. 
Its antecedence and development straddled the EU referendum and the snap general election 
announced in April 2017. This resulted in a conservative minority government, supported on 
a confidence and supply basis by the 10 Democratic Unionist MPs from Northern Ireland. It 
took office on 8th June 2017.  
The precariousness of the government’s power basis partially explains the difficulties and 
limitations of the on-going legislative programme referred to above, as well as the lack of 
further changes to the structural and organisational landscapes of public services in England 
generally, and not merely in the emergency services. There has been no further significant 
primary legislation, other than economic policy and Brexit-related legislation since the 2017 
election. Even then, as can be seen from the updated departmental plans and the latest 
annual treasury ‘supply’ estimates referred to above, in practice, there has also been no 
fundamental review of economic policy since this time. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next sections will look at recent changes in the 
organisational landscape of the three individual emergency services. We will begin with the 
police as the largest service and the service that was the focus of the earliest reforms. 
Although the activity of Ambulance Services and their organisations are much larger than Fire 
and Rescue Services, it is helpful to consider Fire and Rescue Services after the police because 
the government has modelled their reforms of Fire and Rescue Services on previous police 
reforms. Ambulance Services then provide us with an altogether different perspective as the 
services themselves have remained relatively unscathed while the organisational landscape 
around them has been changing rapidly.     
 
Police Services 
The police in the UK are an amalgam of ‘territorial’ or locally based services and more 
specialised forces. The latter have responsibility for more complex and serious levels of crime 
and predominantly operate on a national basis. This section is concerned with the 
organisational landscape of the territorial police forces that are controlled locally and deal 
with the vast majority of crimes, such as robbery, burglary, arson, and assault.  
The most fundamental changes to the organisation of the territorial police services were not 
occasioned by the Policing and Crime Act 2017 itself, but by the series of changes instigated 
by Theresa May when she became Home Secretary in May 2010, under the conservative and 
liberal democrat coalition government of 2010 to 2015.  
The introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners. 
The introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) represented a significant change 
to the governance of policing in England and Wales as it introduced more direct democratic 
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accountability to the determination of local policing priorities. A directly elected individual 
replaced the former police authorities and provided a supposedly visible and accountable 
focus for local policing priorities, local policy debate and collaborative delivery of services. 
The Coalition Government published a consultation in 2010 entitled 'Policing in the 21st 
Century' (Home Office, 2010), which represented their future vision for policing, and included 
the introduction of PCCs as its central idea. This was quickly followed by the introduction of 
the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill in December 2010 and the Police Reform and 
Social Responsibility Act in 2011. The first elections for PCCs were held in November 2012, 
and the new commissioners took office on 22 November 2012. 
Under the 2011 Act, the core functions of PCCs are to:  
• secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force within their area, 
• to hold the chief constable to account for the delivery of the police and crime plan.  
PCCs are also charged with holding the police finances and assets and raising the local policing 
precept from council tax and are required to produce an annual report to the public on 
progress in policing. There is little evidence from the Spending Review (HM Treasury, 2015) 
or the Home Office single departmental plans (Home Office, 2016a, 2018b) that the 
introduction of PCCs have impacted on the aggregate level of funding available to the police 
services or influenced its macro-economic policies.  
However, none of these are any different to the previous responsibilities of the police 
authorities, although PCCs did become responsible for the appointment, suspension, and 
dismissal of the chief constable, which was the media’s initial focus of their post-election 
activity.  
There was however considerable scepticism and disquiet about the introduction of PCCs, 
from both the public, the media, and the wider criminal justice community, not least because 
of the speed of introduction and the ‘lack of evidence’ to support the politicians’ claims 
(Murphy et al., 2018). Lister and Rowe (2015) suggest that together with high levels of public 
confusion and disinterest, this scepticism culminated in turnouts of less than 15% for the first 
PCC elections in 2012. 
By November 2013, the Independent Police Commission (IPC, 2013), established by the Home 
Secretary Theresa May under the former Chief Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Lord 
Stevens, was already suggesting that there needed to be greater attention on the ‘social 
justice model of policing’ with greater focus on preventing crime, harm and disorder, and 
greater emphasis on neighbourhood policing as a core commitment of all PCCs. Stevens 
considered the PCC model to be ‘flawed’ and called for its replacement, although this view 
was quickly dismissed by the politicians of all parties. 
Whilst the governance of the police in England and Wales undoubtedly changed, the amount 
of change in the organisational landscape of police service delivery looks less radical and 
remains open to debate. London and the Metropolitan Police, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
were not affected by these governance changes, there were no amalgamations of police 
forces or boundary changes and no new front-line ‘service delivery’ organisations were 
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created, other than the National Crime Agency which replaced the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency and absorbed the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre.  
It was not the 2011 Act that dealt with the extension of police powers, police complaints, 
discipline and inspection, and cross border and inter-service collaboration.  These were the 
subject of the Policing and Crime Act 2017. However, before examining the changes to the 
public assurance domain let us turn to changes in the organisational landscape of the policy 
development domain. 
The policy domain 
The organisational landscape of policy making for the police is one of the more 
straightforward and least complex landscapes in the UK. This was the case prior to the post-
2010 reforms and the landscape, in our view, remains relatively simple, if a little more 
complicated after the May’s reforms. 
This is partially because the police are ultimately the responsibility of the Home Office, and 
the Home Office, by virtue of its range of responsibilities and historical modus operandi, is 
still one of the most top-down, centralised and prescriptive policy making regimes in 
government today.  It is not difficult to imagine how policy making for National Security, 
Immigration and Counter Terrorism could be this way, but, as we will explain later, these 
tendencies are evident throughout Home Office policy making including local and 
neighbourhood policing. The activities of Mrs May’s ‘fiercely loyal’ and ‘over-exuberant’ 
special advisors and her inner policy circle within the Home Office set the tone for her later 
government (Warrell et al., 2017). This narrow and exclusive approach to policy making is still 
evident in the latest public consultations from the Home Office and its non-departmental 
public bodies, on local policing and its formal monitoring arrangements (Home Office, 2017; 
HMICFRS, 2018). 
Prior to 2010, policy development and responsibility for local policing was overseen by so-
called national ‘tripartite’ arrangements. This trio consisted of the Home Office, the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA), 
the latter being the collective body representing the views of the police authorities. Although 
clearly not a trinity of equals, the three parties met formally and regularly, and this collective 
approach reflected the joined-up policy and delivery ethos of the New Labour administrations.  
The triumvirate was advised on more specialist matters by related bodies such as the Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), the National Policing Improvement Agency 
(NPIA) or the Audit Commission, or on workforce matters by representative bodies, such as 
the Police Federation. These were all replaced or reformed in the new arrangements.  
The Home Office has recently reverted to a more dominant position with a top-down, much 
more prescriptive approach to policy making. The APA and the ACPO have been reformed and 
the influence of their successors, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the 
National Police Chiefs Council, greatly reduced by statute and circumstances (Murphy et al., 
2017). The NPIA have been superseded by the College of Policing and HMIC reformed into 
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Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), both with 
their influence generally reduced.  
Public Assurance and Regulation 
In 2014, the National Audit Office (NAO) was already concerned that the complex and 
changing organisational landscape of policing (NAO, 2014) together with the changing 
accountability and transparency arrangements, were leading to concerns about the assurance 
of value for money in police services (NAO, 2015a). This was before the latest series of 
organisational changes. 
The most significant organisations in the public assurance arrangements for policing have for 
many years been HMIC, in terms of operational performance, and the external auditors in 
terms of fiduciary responsibilities and value for money.  
HMIC was established in 1856. Its first 150 years have been recorded by Cowley and Todd as, 
in the words of Sir Ronnie Flanagan, the Chief Inspector, ‘an organisation conceived to ensure 
the wise spending of exchequer grants by police forces became a catalyst for change and 
reform, the guardian of professional standards and the credible conscience of the Police 
Service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland’ (Cowley and Todd, 2006, p.1).  
This was immediately before HMIC were modernised into an ‘inspectorate for improvement’ 
under the New Labour administrations (Office of Public Services Reform, 2003), although they 
later escaped being amalgamated with Her Majesty’s Inspector of Courts, Her Majesty’s 
Inspector of Prisons, and Her Majesty’s Inspector of Probation during Labours proposals for 
creating four super inspectorates in Education, Health and Social Care, Local Government and 
Criminal Justice (Thompson, 2005). 
In 2013 the Stevens report (IPC, 2013) recommended the abolition of HMIC and the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission in favour of a new body to oversee standards and 
complaints and rumours abounded about its possible inclusion in a cull of non-departmental 
public bodies that subsequently became known (erroneously) as the ‘bonfire of the quango’s 
(The Guardian, 2012).  
The fact that HMIC escaped was largely due to the appointment of a new chief inspector and 
HMIC board. Tom Winsor, previously the rail regulator, had produced his reports on police 
pay and terms of conditions with a series of recommendations that the government was 
happy to implement (Winsor 2011, 2012). He was appointed chief inspector with a new board 
drawn from a much wider regulatory and inspectorate background, than just ex-policemen 
Instead of abolishing HMIC, Mrs May increased its budget to fund a new programme of force 
inspections under a new ‘Performance, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Legitimacy’ framework 
(HMIC, 2017). This programme had a striking resemblance to former Audit Commission 
programmes and HMIC have subsequently provided regular assessments of organisational 
performance, as well as thematic and more specialist inspections of services and individual 
incidents. The nature and form of HMIC operations has since gradually widened in scope and 
in terms of the organisations that fell under its remit (Murphy et al., 2018).  Although Mrs 
May likes to portray herself as a hands-off and light touch sponsor or overseer of police 
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performance and activity (BBC, 2013), in practice she effectively sought to micromanage the 
service through the HMIC and other regulators.     
The second long-term pillar of external assurance to both the public and the government was 
the external audit of the service. As mentioned above, this was becoming of concern to the 
NAO not least because of the narrowing of the scope and content of the audit brought about 
by the 2014 Local Audit and Accountability Act and its new procedures for local auditing by 
lightly regulated private auditors that the individual services are now allowed to appoint. The 
organisational landscape of external audit is now a patchwork quilt dominated by the five 
largest auditing firms.   
The part of the organisational landscape relating to police standards, police conduct, and 
investigation of complaints against the police has also undergone significant change. 
All complaints against the police are internally investigated via internal arrangements. An 
internal Professional Standards Department upholds and promotes the standards of 
professional behaviour in the force and the standards are set out in a Code of Ethics. The 
internal systems escalate the most serious complaints to an external national system. There 
is also provision for the most serious complaints to be referred directly to either external 
system. 
In historical terms, the first Police Complaints Board was established in 1977 following a series 
of scandals in the Metropolitan Police. The Board was succeeded by the Police Complaints 
Authority (PCA) in 1985, a system in which all complaints against the police were investigated 
by other police officers. As there was not a single prosecution or disciplinary findings against 
the police during the PCA’s existence, the Independent Police Complaints Commission was 
established in 2004. This demonstrably more effective organisation in its early years was later 
criticised for the length of its investigations, and in particular the fatal shooting of Mark 
Duggan, by the police in Tottenham, north London, which sparked the 2011 riots. It was 
rebranded and reformed into the Independent Office of Police Complaints (IOPC) in January 
2018, although like its predecessor, it is a non-departmental body of the Home Office. 
The reforms included slightly wider powers for the IOPC to initiate its own investigations 
rather than waiting for referrals from forces and the replacement of a panel of commissioners 
by a Director General.  
One further aspect of the assurance domain, which we have referred to in passing and which, 
to an extent, had been assumed by ACPO, was the establishment of police standards. This 
responsibility was transferred to the new College of Policing with the specific objective of 
establishing a Code of Policing Principles and Standards of Professional Behaviour as part of 
its aims.  
The final part of the assurance changes was the establishment of a single repository of data 
and information on which the government and public could base any evaluation of the 
performance of the service. This data and information would previously have included the 
Home Office official crime statistics, the HMIC and Audit Commission reports, individual 
police authority reports, and self-assessments from the NPIA or the LGA’s Improvement and 
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Development Agency, and more specialised reports and investigations on individual subjects 
or incidents.  
A new single website www.police.uk was therefore established in 2011, allegedly to enable 
the public to see crime levels in their area, and the action being taken by the police and 
criminal justice agencies.  As a glance at its site map will show, it is actually primarily a 
signposting service to police services with virtually no evaluative or critical information.   
 
Fire and Rescue Services       
Between the turn of the century and 2010, Fire and Rescue Services in the UK experienced 
unprecedented reform with the introduction of new performance management 
arrangements and service modernisation, greater emphasis on prevention and protection, 
and the rise of the Audit Commission as the principal regulator. Co-production and collective 
responsibility for policy and service delivery were enshrined in successive National 
Frameworks in England (ODPM, 2004, 2006; DCLG, 2008), while Scotland and Wales 
experienced devolution. The need for better collaboration and pressure for greater ‘blue light’ 
co-operation was enshrined in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, that introduced Community 
Safety Partnerships; the Civil Contingencies and the Fire and Rescue Services Acts of 2004, 
and the introduction of Local Area Agreements in the Local Government and Public 
Involvement in Health Act 2017. All this radically changed both the modus operandi and the 
organisational landscape of Fire and Rescue Services in the UK (Raynsford 2016; Murphy and 
Greenhalgh, 2018). 
This period was however followed by the austerity-localism and cutback management agenda 
of the Coalition Government (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). This manifested itself in a 
systematic dismantling of the improvement infrastructure and centralised performance 
management arrangements in favour of ‘Sector-led improvement’; a retreat from evidence-
based policy making and the abdication of leadership and management of Fire and Rescue 
Services by the DCLG under Secretary of State Eric Pickles (Ferry and Murphy, 2015; NAO, 
2015b; Murphy and Ferry, 2018).  
A new National Framework for Fire and Rescue Services had been published in 2012. It 
identified a range of ‘new’ or increasing risks and challenges such as climate change, an ageing 
population, and the threat of terrorism, but emphasised the need to reduce spending (DCLG, 
2012). There was a shift from co-production and collaborative working across the public 
sector towards a greater emphasis on individual organisational accountability and 
accountability to local residents.  Accountability moved from central government as 
responsibility was handed to fire and rescue authorities, giving authorities theoretical 
freedom and flexibility to deliver services while in practice unremitting spending cuts 
restricted their ability to act. 
By 2015 the inadequacy of this approach had become evident to a government, which had 
become discontent with the speed of change within the fire sector. It coincided with Mrs 
May’s increasing conviction that the introduction of PCCs had cross-party support and was a 
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potential catalyst for change (Murphy and Greenhalgh, 2018). The conservative manifesto 
included a suggestion that police and fire should work together and the role of PCCs should 
be developed. 
However, it was two critical reports into accountability and the financial resilience of Fire and 
Rescue Services from the NAO (2015b, 2015c) and the Public Accounts Select Committee of 
the House of Commons (2016) that really ‘lit the blue touch paper’. These criticised the 
leadership, oversight, and management of the sector by the DCLG. They noted the erosion of 
the evidence upon which policy and decision making was taking placed and highlighted the 
lack of an independent external inspectorate.  
After the first report in November 2015, the government announced the transfer of 
responsibility for Fire and Rescue Services back to the Home Office. After the second report, 
Mrs May announced that she would be accepting all of the recommendations of the PAC 
report and including additional amendments in the Policing and Crime Bill then at its third 
reading stage in the House of Commons (Home Office, 2016c). Thus, chapters 1 to 4 of the 
Policing and Crime Act 2017, are some of the most radical potential changes in the 
organisational landscape of Fire and Rescue Services, but Fire or Rescue does not feature in 
its title.  
The policy domain  
While it may be early days, the new policy making approach and organisational landscape for 
Fire and Rescue Services at the national level under the Home Office looks remarkably familiar 
to that of the police.  
Publishing the new national framework between Christmas and the New Year with little 
publicity does not suggest the Home Office is looking for open consensual evidence-based 
policy development still less joined-up policy making or collaborative delivery. The minimum 
six weeks statutory consultation process closed in February.  
The government’s response to the 70 representations made to the consultation (Home Office, 
2018c) was published on the 8th May, the same day that the final framework was published 
(Home Office, 2018a). The new framework came into effect on the 1st June 2018. The policy 
appears to be almost exclusively driven by civil servants, minister’s special advisors and their 
political masters, with little discussion or engagement with third parties. It is not even clear 
from the government’s response to representations how much influence even key 
stakeholders such as the NFCC (National Fire Chiefs Council) or the Association of Police & 
Crime Commissioner or the LGA have had on the framework.  
The whole process and all consultation responses came from the Fire and Rescue Sector and 
PCCs. Improving fire safety to the public, at either national or local levels, involves multiple 
services or sectors and policy programmes should preferably be aligned and mutually 
reinforcing, as demonstrated by the Grenfell disaster.  
It is too early to see how the policy development process will operate under Police Fire and 
Crime Commissioners, but Mrs May, when introducing the new arrangements criticised the 
poor and deteriorating evidence base available to policy makers and service deliverers (Home 
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Office, 2016c).  Evidence-based policy development has been a characteristic of Fire and 
Rescue Services throughout its history. Adequately assured, high-quality data is vital to this 
process.  Effective tools, systems, and processes to capture, interrogate and interpret data, 
make it accessible to policy developers, service deliverers, and intelligible to the public are 
just as essential to national and local policy making as it is in the service delivery and assurance 
domains.  
The first report from Dame Judith Hackitt’s investigation (Hackitt, 2017) into the fire 
regulations suggests the current evidence base is insufficient for the task. In that case, it has 
already been found to be partial, contradictory, and no longer fit for purpose. The evidence 
base for the latest national framework is in our view neither comprehensive nor compelling.  
Whilst a new central body for standards, codes, and regulations is one part of the 
government’s new sector infrastructure, as well as a new dedicated website (similar to 
www.police.uk), both of these initiatives, are at best, in the early stages of development. 
HMICFRS may contribute to this evidence in the future, however in comparison to the 
research and intelligence provided by the former Audit Commission, the former Improvement 
& Development Agency and its Knowledge Exchange, the Local Government Leadership 
Centre, the former Fire Inspectorate, and/or the Fire Service College, it is not very reassuring. 
Service delivery 
The governance and management of Fire and Rescue Services in England and Wales is likely 
to take a number of different forms as a result of the Policing and Crime Act 2017.  
Since devolution, Scotland has developed a single national service responsible to the devolved 
government. Northern Ireland has had a single service governed by a board since 2006. 
London Fire Brigade has had an elected mayor and bespoke policy and scrutiny arrangements 
for some time, although statutory responsibility for the running of the brigade now lies with 
the London Fire Commissioner, who replaced the London Fire and Emergency Planning 
Authority in April 2018. Manchester is following a similar path and other core cities such as 
Liverpool and Birmingham who have recently elected Mayors are investigating this among 
other options. 
In the remainder of England and Wales, there is now discretion to transfer the governance of 
Fire and Rescue Services to the PCC, who would become the Police, Fire and Crime 
Commissioner (PFCC), either as a governing body or as a direct employer of all staff. This is 
subject to an appropriate ‘local case’ being made by the PCC to the Home Secretary. It applies 
to existing single authority, combined authority, and metropolitan authority Fire and Rescue 
Services. As this process is discretionary, and the Home Office has to date received eight local 
cases, it is reasonable to assume that some existing fire and rescue authorities will remain in 
the foreseeable future although the direction is clearly towards more PFCCs in the future. 
As a result of Chapter 1 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017, all emergency services are actively 
investigating joint or collaborative delivery of a greater range of their services or activities. 
Although all regional ambulance services are actively engaged in at least some of these 
initiatives, the vast majority of activity has been in police and fire services with back-office 
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support and estates initiatives currently the most numerous. Combined control centres have 
also figured prominently. As a result of previous legislation, fire and rescue authorities can 
outsource parts or all of their services to private or voluntary sector providers, although this 
has had to-date limited impact.  
One other consequence has been the loss of momentum towards combining fire and rescue 
authorities and services into larger service units, which was encouraged on a voluntary basis 
by previous Labour, Conservative and Coalition Governments but has made very slow 
progress in England and Wales in the past 30 years. It is interesting to speculate as to whether 
the new governance arrangements will make amalgamations more or less likely in the future, 
although the economies of scale, organisational efficiencies, and consequent resilience of the 
larger services suggest pressures to amalgamate will not disappear.           
The organisational landscape for the delivery of Fire and Rescue Services therefore appears 
paradoxical. There are unlikely to be significant changes in the overall number of core service 
delivery organisations but the nature, scope, structure, governance, and disposition of the 
services they provide are going to diversify considerably. 
Public Assurance and Regulation 
Concerns about the deteriorating public assurance arrangements and in particular whether 
the risks to fire and services achieving value for money in a period of diminishing resources 
from the central government were at the heart of the NAO (2015b, 2015c) and PAC (2016) 
reports. The basis for these concerns has been articulated elsewhere (Murphy and 
Greenhalgh, 2018; Murphy et al., 2018), and it is the response to these reports and in 
particular the changes to the organisational landscape of public assurance surrounding Fire 
and Rescue Services, that concerns us in this paper. 
In May 2018, the government announced that a Fire Standards Board will be created to 
ensure standards are nationally coordinated to a high level across the sector. The proposal 
had been developed with the NFCC, the Local Government Association and other partners 
following the NAO and PAC reports. The organisation will have a governing board which will 
be independent from government and the NFCC will produce the standards, drawing on 
external expertise as they see fit.  
In addition, as mentioned above a new central data repository with a dedicated website 
available to the public, will be created. This will be similar to the police website but is in the 
very early stages of design and development. 
The most significant development was to be the creation of a new rigorous and independent 
inspection regime delivered by a new external inspectorate. In the event the new 
inspectorate emerged as an extended and rebranded HMIC, which has been renamed 
HMICFRS, with the same board as its predecessor reporting annually to the Home Secretary 
who would also have the power to direct inspections.  
Ideally, a truly independent external inspectorate and chief inspector would be focussed on 
the publics’ interest and public disclosure. They would design and implement, hopefully in 
collaboration with the government and the services, a robust, comprehensive, risk-based, and 
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proportionate inspection programme. Rather than reporting to the government they should 
have independent reporting rights and responsibilities.    
However, following the Home Office example, HMICFRS issued a consultation document on 
its proposed inspection regime in the week before Christmas 2017 (HMICFRS, 2017), with a 
statutory consultation that closed in February 2018. The final regime and first years 
programme were issued in the week before Easter on 29th March 2018 (HMICFRS, 2018).  The 
first pilot inspections are being implemented and it is not the purpose of this chapter to 
evaluate individual organisations. Suffice to say HMICFRS is clearly the single most significant 
addition to the public assurance landscape of Fire and Rescue Services and their strategic and 
operational positioning as well as their performance is crucial to the sector’s improvement.  
It will also be interesting to see the nature and development of the relationship between the 
emerging HMICFRS regime and the other key assurance regime, namely the financial 
assurance arrangements. As mentioned in relation to the police, external audit arrangements 
have weakened and become less transparent in recent years with an increasing reliance on 
so-called Armchair Auditors (Home Office, 2017a). This partially results from the loss of the 
Audit Commission, from the narrowing of the scope and content of the external audit in the 
Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, and from clearly inadequate public reporting 
requirements.  
 
Ambulance Services  
The history of organisational change in ambulance services themselves is conceptually 
relatively simple in terms of two aspects: the nature of the services provided and the 
organisations that provide the services.  
Ambulance services have gone from an emergency service that sought to get patients to 
clinical or medical treatment as quickly and efficiently as possible, to a service providing a 
range of pre-hospital urgent and planned healthcare services for people who often have 
serious or life-threatening conditions (Pollock, 2013; Wankhade, 2011). The modern 
ambulance has one of the most important concentrations of sophisticated medical and 
clinical equipment (and human resources) in the NHS. However, this change is not the primary 
focus of this paper. 
Service delivery 
The history of NHS Ambulance Service organisations in the UK, which is our focus, is one of 
relentless rationalisation and increasing size in terms of individual organisations providing 
core services, supplemented by a slowly declining, but extremely valuable voluntary and 
charitable sector operating in close collaboration with the NHS. In recent years this has been 
complicated at the margins by the privatisation of some non-emergency transport services, a 
process exacerbated by the implementation of the Health and Social Care Act 2012.  
The National Health Service Act 1946 gave councils in England and Wales a statutory 
responsibility to provide an emergency ambulance service, although they could contract this 
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to a voluntary service. The service remained a local authority responsibility until 1974 when 
the 142 ambulance services in England, and Wales were transferred to central government 
control by the National Health Service Reorganisation Act 1973 and consolidated into 53 
services under regional or area health authorities.  
As a result of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, England was covered 
by 31 ambulance trusts, which were re-structured again in 2006. By then the system 
comprised 14 NHS organisations, 11 of which were trusts covering the regions of 
England with single services for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland respectively. This 
remains the case today. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 was the biggest top-down 
reorganisation of the NHS in its history. It radically changed the organisational landscape, in 
which Ambulance Services are obliged to operate, but the only change it made to the 10 
Ambulance Trusts in England, was to make them Foundation Trusts. The Association of 
Ambulance Chief Executives (AACE) acts as a central organisation for the ambulance services 
in providing support and coordinating national policy while also acting as a central resource 
for information about NHS ambulance services.   
Although ambulance services are not complicated organisations per se after the 2012 Act, 
they have subsequently had to operate in an NHS organisational landscape and operating 
environment, that has become more complex and makes it extremely difficult to manage 
their operations and their finances.  
Ambulances and ambulance services have very little control over the demand for their 
services, they go wherever the need arises or an incident happens. They also have very little 
influence over the next step in the process - the supply or capacity of hospitals to accept 
patients, with the unwanted consequence that increasing turnaround times at hospitals have 
entered the nation’s consciousness.   
The changes to the Health and Social Care organisational landscape was so complicated that 
in 2012 the Department of Health produced 19 factsheets to try and explain the changes. 
These factsheets included a health and care structures factsheet, a clinically-led 
commissioning factsheet, and a greater accountability, locally and national factsheet 
(Department of Health and Social Care, 2012). These give some idea of the extent of change 
in the organisation and system surrounding ambulance trusts, while the provider regulation 
factsheet explains the role of foundation trusts. In effect, both the commissioning and the 
provider landscapes became more complicated at local, regional, and national levels, as more 
rather than fewer organisations were created. Operationally it was also made more difficult 
as key systemic responsibilities were replaced by much looser and less effective arrangements. 
For example, the former strategic health authorities and primary care trusts had specific 
obligations to coordinate and oversee the collective provision of NHS services by local delivery 
organisations in defined local areas, both strategically and operationally.  
Since the 2012 Act was implemented there has been widespread and increasing public and 
government acceptance that ambulance services have been under extreme and unrelenting 
pressure, reinforced by extensive media coverage over the inability to admit patients quickly 
and efficiently to Accident and Emergency Departments (A&E) up and down the country. This 
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results from the inexorable increase in the number of admissions to A&E, exacerbated every 
year by winter illnesses and poor living conditions, known as ‘winter pressures’ (Wankhade, 
2018; PAC, 2017).  
The NAO (2017) recently confirmed that this problem is now nationwide, likely to continue 
and is unlikely to be resolved by short term fixes or one-off injections of short term resources. 
In these circumstances, the government’s response has often been structural reform, if only 
to distract criticism from government and respond to inevitable calls for the government to 
‘do something’. 
Further structural reform of ambulance services would clearly have been counter-productive 
and as mentioned above, the proposed governance and operational changes for Ambulance 
Services suggested in the consultation “Enabling closer working between the Emergency 
Services” (Home Office, 2016b) were quietly dropped from the subsequent  Policing and 
Crime Act 2017.  
The only proposals that survived the scrutiny and consultation processes were the provisions 
for greater emergency service collaboration in Part 1 Chapter of the Act, designed to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces, through greater collaboration with the other 
emergency services. It makes no claim to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
ambulance services and ‘ambulances’ or ‘ambulance services’ are mentioned only eleven 
times in the whole 2017 Act with all mentions being in Chapter 1.  
The organisational landscape of service delivery for ambulances was made more complicated 
by the changes brought about by the Health and Social Care Act 2012, and have not been 
significantly changed since. It remains to be seen whether or how the implementation of 
Sustainable Transformation Plans or the move to Accountable Care systems (more recently 
described as Integrated Care systems), will impact on ambulance services. 
The policy domain 
If the service delivery domain for ambulance services has become more complex and 
complicated, at least policy making is much more straightforward. At national level policy is 
effectively determined by the government through the Department of Health and NHS 
England, who between them determine overall policy on commissioning. In the past, they 
were advised by the Ambulance Services Commissioning Group of the NHS Federation, which 
effectively consisted of the Ambulance Trusts. Since 2015 the NHS Clinical Commissioners (the 
independent collective voice of Clinical Commissioning Groups) has taken on the role of 
hosting the National Ambulance Commissioners Group (later renamed NAC Network). From 
its origins as an informal forum for the lead ambulance commissioners in England, it has 
developed into a wider network of commissioning managers and clinical leads from Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) across the country, with a key interest in ambulance 
commissioning. 
At the local level policy and commissioning is operationalised through a designated lead CCG 
for the region (NHS Federation, 2012).  Previously, at regional and local levels this would have 
been influenced by Strategic Health Authorities and the Primary Care Trusts whose role it was 
19 
 
to coordinate and oversee the collective provision of NHS services by local delivery 
organisations in defined local areas. This has been replaced with much looser arrangement 
involving lead CCGs, and was clearly one of the drivers for the creation of the NAC Network. 
This apparently relatively simple policy landscape for ambulances has to be caveated and put 
into context, and that context is the NHS itself. The NHS as a whole is a huge organisation, 
with an annual operating budget of some £120bn, and around 1.2m staff (Department of 
Health, 2016). Whilst individual ambulance services would amount to medium-sized 
organisations if they were standalone organisations, they are in reality a part of the NHS and 
when compared to the overall scale of NHS activities and services, their needs can be easily 
overlooked and underappreciated. 
Within the NHS, they find it extremely difficult to compete for influence with the big beasts 
of the general or acute hospitals, or the commissioning sectors. Although a grateful public 
may admire and appreciate the ambulance taking them to hospital, when it comes to 
priorities they appear to prefer to support policy initiatives and extra investment in the 
hospitals or other healthcare environments that subsequently treat them.     
Nevertheless, after many years of acknowledging a growing problem, in 2013 NHS England 
undertook a review of urgent and emergency care with a number of work programmes one 
of which was the Ambulance Response Programme (ARP).  
The ARP included a number of practical initiatives but also included a ‘full review of 
ambulance service measures and quality indicators’. In September 2015, Sheffield 
University’s School of Health and Related Research was engaged to independently monitor, 
analyse and evaluate the ARP and in July 2017 they published their final report (Turner et al., 
2017).  
The ARP covered over 14 million calls, testing a new operating model and a new set of targets. 
The results were so impressive that in the same month as publication, NHS England wrote to 
Jeremy Hunt recommending that the new model be rolled out across the country by the end 
of 2017 (Keogh, 2017). By December 2017, a formal government impact assessment 
confirmed that the ARP ‘delivers operational efficiency, financial efficiency in terms of cost 
avoidance and potential improvements to clinical outcomes’. It looks as if the new model and 
performance arrangements will be implemented in the near future. These will mean 
significant internal changes to the nature and deployment of ambulance services, and to their 
working relationships with other key delivery partners. It is not anticipated that they will 
result in any changes to the number of ambulance trusts. 
The ARP is a clear example of the evidence base for a change in policy also becoming part of 
the data and monitoring information for future service delivery, and eventually forming part 
of the public assurance and performance management arrangements for the service. It is, 
therefore, appropriate to turn our attention to the organisational landscape of the assurance 
domain that ambulance services operate within. 
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Public Assurance and Regulation 
As ambulance services remain part of the NHS, they are part of the largest and most 
comprehensive information and databases in the world, and the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (formerly National Institute for Clinical Excellence) provides 
comprehensive evidence-based standards and guidance. As in the policy domain, their 
relatively small size can be both a challenge and an opportunity. 
The NHS public assurance and regulatory regime is inevitably one of the largest and most 
complicated in the public services. However, there are a number of key institutional pillars, in 
terms of service delivery and quality; financial resilience and fiduciary duties, public reporting 
and collaborative engagement with other key public and private service providers. 
The Care Quality Commission (CQC) is the independent regulator of health and adult social 
care in England. Their purpose is to “make sure health and social care services provide people 
with safe, effective, compassionate, high-quality care and we encourage care services to 
improve”. They were originally formed from the amalgamation of the Healthcare Commission 
(formally the Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection) and the Commission for Social 
Care Inspection (2003-2009), although the role and remit has expanded to other areas of 
provision. The two former commissions were created from previous inspectorates under the 
new labour modernisation initiative of transforming public inspectorates to focus on 
‘inspection for improvement’ (Office of Public Services Reform, 2003).  
The subsequent creation of CQC was part of Labour’s proposals for creating four super 
inspectorates in Education, Health and Social Care, Local Government and Criminal Justice 
(Thompson, 2005). Although CQC has grown to become the largest inspection and regulatory 
organisation in the UK, there is a bespoke ambulance inspection framework which was last 
updated in February 2018. It is widely anticipated that this will incorporate changes arising 
out of the ARP in due course.  
One enduring problem for the ambulance services is, however, to keep within the resource 
envelope of their operating budget set annually by the NHS. This was exemplified by their 
experience with the previous requirement to achieve Foundation Trust Status. Foundation 
Trust status was abandoned as a result of the enduring financial crisis in the NHS, which 
undermined the supposed autonomy and financial resilience of these trusts  
Prior to 2010, NHS trusts were externally audited and monitored by the District Audit and the 
Audit Commissions through Auditors Local Evaluations. Currently, they are subject to 
regulation by NHS Improvement which incorporated MONITOR the regulator of NHS Financial 
Trusts in 2016. Originally established in 2004, MONITOR, was responsible for authorising, 
monitoring and regulating NHS Foundation Trusts. Ambulance trusts collectively found 
achieving the financial standards of foundation status particularly difficult and a lower 
proportion of ambulance trusts achieved foundation status than any other category of NHS 
service providers.  
This was because, as mentioned above, ambulance services have very little control over the 
demand for their services and little influence over the supply or capacity of hospitals to accept 
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patients. With demand rising inexorably, hospital bed numbers declining, and commissioning 
budgets squeezed, ambulance trust deficits were inevitable (NAO, 2017; Wankhade, 2018).  
As with the Police and Fire Services, public assurance from external audit has weakened and 
become less transparent as a result of the narrowing of the scope and content of the audit 
brought about by the 2014 Local Audit and Accountability Act and the current procedures for 
local auditing by lightly regulated private auditors that individual services are allowed to 
appoint.  
Public reporting engagement and scrutiny has, however, been improved as the Parliamentary 
and Health Service Ombudsman and the Local Government Ombudsman (for Social Care) 
have been complemented by the creation of national and local ‘Healthwatch’ established 
under the 2012 Act as the “independent national champion for people who use health and 
social care services”. These public and patient champions were created as a result of the Mid 
Staffordshire Hospitals scandals and the reports of persistently poor patient care (HMG 2013). 
They comprise a national team supporting a network of approximately 150 local Healthwatch 
organisations that are largely based on local authority boundaries, although rationalisations 
and amalgamations are beginning to occur as a result of budget cuts.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to do two things to help our understanding of the organisational 
landscape of the three emergency services. 
Conceptually, it has attempted to identify the nature of roles and responsibilities that are 
involved in the three activities or ‘domains’ as we have labelled them, that are policy 
development, public service delivery, and public assurance. It has tried to show how these 
are related to each other and to wider considerations such as public service values. It has 
suggested that each of these domains is made up of a subset of concepts and activities, some 
of which are common to all three domains, and some of which are more specific to a particular 
domain.    
We have then taken that conceptual framework and attempted to map the changing 
organisational landscape of the three emergency services in terms of the three domains. 
Although it is not our purpose to evaluate the performance of individual organisations, past 
or current, we recognise that we may have strayed into subjective or evaluative areas when 
comparing the current landscape to ones that have existed in the past. Our purpose is to map 
the overall picture, so that future research can look at the strengths and weaknesses, and 
perhaps identify potential improvements in the organisational landscape or the conceptual 
framework.   
What emerges in the organisational landscape and conceptual maps for the police and even 
more so for Fire and Rescue Services, apart from the (over) dominance of the Home Office, 
and potentially to a lesser extent HMICFRS in the public assurance domain, is the immaturity 
of many of the organisations in the policy and the public assurance domains while the service 
delivery organisations have remained relatively stable. 
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In the ambulance services, which appear to have been much neglected in the recent past, in 
terms of all three domains, the contextual and organisational landscape is dominated by the 
structures imperatives and institutions of the wider NHS and its policy development, service 
delivery and public assurance arrangements. Although these are almost continually changing, 
they appear to be the most comprehensive and robust of the organisational landscapes. 
However, in the ARP, there finally appears to be an initiative with the potential to have a 
transformative impact on all three domains within the service. Whether it will do so will, of 
course, be for others to evaluate in the future.    
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